The dying moments of 2001 saw pyrrhic American victory in Afghanistan. Yet after one full year, the entire Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership and their families, numbering in their thousands, have eluded the American grasp.
As mentioned in these columns last October, the crucial delay in initial air attacks gave the Islamists ample opportunity to re-organise and disperse. 2002 saw the first stage of classic insurgency, small level hit and run attacks and some assassinations. The Islamists have established bases in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the first stage of insurgency. But such is the American dread of this form of warfare (the 'V' for Vietnam word can still cause a chill at an American gathering), that no analyst or media has dared to utter the word counterinsurgency,' when in reality that is what the Americans are already fighting in Afghanistan.
The Americans, who have otherwise an impressive record of military victories, are at sea when it comes to fighting insurgency. The reasons are many, but at the risk of oversimplification, it can be said to be American impatience and lack of colonial experience. The signs are there for any one to see -- a puppet government, no ideology to rival 'Islam' -- Americanism cannot be a substitute to jihadi Islam.
The gates of Kabul may yet notch up another name of another defeated aggressor. The Americans may well join such illustrious losers as Alexander, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The signs of that happening in the future were all visible except to the Americans who want to wish away a counterinsurgency in the 21st century.
When the US suddenly turned on Iraq, it was an indirect admission that even a Hyper Power cannot alter the geo-political environment!
The ruling elite in Islamic states have been quick to seize this opportunity to demand economic aid on the plea that they need it for their exploding populations which otherwise would turn 'jihadi.' The rulers have then been clever to keep the jihadis on the right side by carrying out sham attempts to crush them. All Muslim majority countries are playing this game, but none so well as Pakistan.
Pakistan has one additional card: its nuclear capability. The fear of these falling into jihadi hands is being used to browbeat the Americans.
There has been much satisfaction in 'peace at any cost' lobbies as well as in the West that a open conflict was avoided in the subcontinent. When jihadis in a neighbouring country attack Parliament, slaughter women and children in army barracks and kill pilgrims, and the victim country exercises 'restraint,' the terrorists have succeeded in further raising the 'bar of tolerance.'
India's non action in 2002 has made it absolutely certain that an even more audacious attack will be mounted in the coming year. As the recent election in Gujarat showed, this is leading slowly but surely to a situation where a major conflagration will be inevitable.
There are two reasons for this pessimistic assessment. One is the fact that the real problem is not the jihadi element in Pakistan, they are subhuman and need to be liquidated, but the so-called moderate and modern element that connives at this. They have calculated, and so far correctly, that when push comes to shove, India will always back down. They have a 800-year history to back them up.
The second problem is the Indian establishment that is yet to absorb the nuances of nuclear 'poker.' All and sundry keep repeating the 'mantra' of deterrence when the need is for 'compellence.' Deterrence works to prevent war. But when an opponent is already at war and using force (the ongoing proxy war) mere words, threats, deployment and sabre rattling will not work. To stop the ongoing war, escalatory 'action' is absolutely necessary. It is only then a condition of parity is created and a stable equilibrium can be achieved.
US intervention has been the 'key' to peace in the subcontinent, and not fear of nuclear weapons. This belief, while it has meant temporary peace, has surely sowed the seeds of future conflict.
Indians and the Americans have failed to realise that by avoiding a limited conflict they have made sure that a major and all out conflict will take place in the future.
History is more often made by the unrelenting forces that have an independent momentum of their own. When two large ships approach each other, there comes a point beyond which a head on collusion is inevitable. The only course open then is to prepare for damage limitation. At a global and subcontinental level, in 2002, we appear to have crossed that point.
