Colonel X on the thin line a soldier walks between action and violation

Days after he joined my unit, one of my officers and two soldiers were blown up by an improvised explosive device. It critically injured another officer and two soldiers.

The wounded youngster suffered permanent spinal injury. He cannot get out of his bed unless heat is applied for an hour. He will shortly be turning 25. But marriage is not on the cards. The other two soldiers are paralysed waist down.

What was our response? I saw the fury in the battalion. The reaction of soldiers who had seen their officer lying in a pool of blood, his brains on the road. Remember that the army is a very closely-knit set-up. Soldiers spend 10 months of the year in barracks. They treat each other like blood relations. We eat, sleep, live and pray together. How would anyone, you or I, react if we held a gun and saw our own kith and kin being brutally murdered?

The first decision I took was NOT to operate in that area for some time. The thought uppermost in my mind was, what if one of my soldiers inadvertently commits an excess? Part of the local media and the covert supporters of militancy would go to town about how the army took 'revenge'. From being a grieving victim -- I wept each evening for the next 30 days in the privacy of my room -- I would be a culprit of a 'human rights violation'.

Two weeks later, the same company apprehended a militant and recovered considerable arsenal. We were stunned when he voluntarily gave us graphic details of the IED blast. It was the handiwork of Hizbul Mujahideen, he said. The IED was laid with the active assistance of the sarpanch (headman) of the nearby village and a few others. He named them all.

After the blast, he continued, the militants came down to the village at night. They were given a hero's welcome -- garlands, gosht (a mutton preparation)...

The militants who activated the IED have since been killed in a gun battle with us. Two more of my men were injured in that encounter. But what about the villagers -- the UGs, or uppergrounds, as we call them -- who had been accomplices in this murder?

They live happily in their homes, tending to their fields, perhaps planning the next blast. I hope you understand the bitterness that my men and I feel over our helplessness. It is a bitterness that gets accentuated when our own countrymen accuse us of 'human rights violations'. As if this is a private war for the army.

I joined the Rashtriya Rifles three years ago. Day after day, we would get information of the likelihood of the presence of militants and/or arsenal in particular houses. Most searches yielded nothing. But reliable intelligence is so hard to get that the army cannot afford to ignore anything that comes its way.

Of course, an evaluation of the veracity is made. But what tools does a soldier have to crosscheck information without giving it all away?

The Kashmiri understands this. Ten years of insurgency has armed him with an ingenious stratagem -- you can settle your personal scores by feeding false information to the army!

A search by an army unit inevitably involves inconvenience to the occupants of the house. Whenever we went for a night search, the fact that people -- women and children included -- would have to leave the warmth of their quilts always hurt our sensibilities. But what was the option? How else do you search a house in a state where, on several occasions, militants have hidden themselves in novel and imaginative ways, the locals have held back the information from search parties and, when all appeared clear, the searchers got shot at?

The point I am making is that some 'excesses' are, unfortunately, intrinsic to the fight against militancy. Most of the locals 'support' militants out of fear. This leads to unavoidable hardships during the operations. Some locals support militancy covertly -- everyone else in the village will tell you who the UGs are, but there is no proof to act against them. The army, which has no investigative machinery, can only watch helplessly as they support, organise and even fund militancy.

I know the expression 'helplessly' sounds incongruous to you. But it is a bitter truth. The UG network is well organised and committed. Locals would freely tell you that Jamaat-e-Islami provides the heart and sinew to militancy. There are UGs in every village who not only provide covert support but keep an eye on others who might 'stray' and assist the security forces. This is the single biggest factor in preventing local support to the security forces.

These death merchants have bought insurance by joining other political outfits or are even well placed in government/police jobs. But where is the proof? And in the absence of proof, what do you do?

Ever wondered how much one is paid for lobbing a grenade?

I must explain the mechanics of the exertion as volunteered by the 'grenade-lobbers' before I tell you how restrain is exercised on these occasions, and at what cost. I must also point out a supreme irony. The grenade-lobbers choose to lob these lethal weapons indiscriminately because they know that the security forces will be held accountable by the locals, the media and their own bosses when law and order appears to deteriorate. So it does not matter who you kill -- so long you make a bang!

Usually the lobber is contacted by a militant. Rs 500 is the standard rate per throw, of which Rs 100 is paid in advance. He is given on-the-spot training -- it does not require a comprehensive regimen to teach a fellow to remove a pin, get rid of the blasted thing and run. It pops after 4 to 7 seconds. An advance of Rs 100 is also given.

When a grenade goes off, it creates a bang so loud that panic is the first natural reaction. No one quite knows if another one is on its way, people scream and run into each other, and the sight of blood adds to the chaos... It takes exceptional nerve to stay cool and steadfastly refuse to cock one's rifle.

A few years ago, the men of a battalion opened fire at a fleeing grenade-lobber. Unfortunately, they killed some civilians in the crowd. A human rights case is still on. In a bid to avoid a similar tragedy, in every monthly talk to my men, I have gone over the drill to be followed if someone lobs a grenade. The final lines invariably have been:

"You will not cock your weapons even if I, your CO, is killed in a grenade blast. I am saying this to obviate inadvertent collateral damage and court cases against you."

I often wonder if there are other organistions in the country who display similar sensitivity. Every word of this is true. But none of this is ever highlighted in the media because it does not make saleable copy and runs counter to a pre-judged belief that the army is not sensitive to human rights.

In 1996, when I saw the situation first, these features stood out:

Each militant group of about 8 to 10 had two or three foreign mercenaries or FMs. This core was the glue that kept the group together. The FMs were increasingly suspicious of the local militant and even treated him with contempt. He felt that given a choice, the local militant would surrender. The assessment of the FMs was, and is, absolutely right. The local militants, if I may tar all of them with one brush, lack the character and will to fight.

Local support for militancy was based on fear. The locals were quite clear by 1996 that this had become an industry for the militants, UGs and the Ikhwanis (surrendered militants now fighting against militancy) -- and it was the common man who was paying the bloody price.

The locals did not like the army. They feared it. The Ikhwanis were and are universally despised.

If there were to be a Pakistan versus India referendum, I got the distinct feeling that Pakistan would lose. The locals are quite clear about the fact that they may actually be worse off with Pakistan.

Three years later, the features are unchanged except on a few scores. Now the bulk of militants in every group are FMs. They trust the locals even less. The disenchantment with the political system has grown. And militancy has taken some hard knocks. There was an upsurge during and after the Kargil war, but the tide has remained against the militancy.

There will, however, be no end till Pakistan stops sending militants armed with weapons and crisp 500 rupee notes.

Interviewed by Chindu Sreedharan

'Losing a boy destroys you' | Back

The Kashmiris
'They took my son away'
'I hate India'

The ex-militants
'Blood is no solution'
'Leave Kashmir alone'